Both commercial and nonprofit research organizations seek to capture the value of their inventions through filing their own patent applications and licensing those inventions to others. Until now, however, researchers have not systematically studied how academic institutions patent and license their DNA-based inventions. The study of licensing practices presents difficulties for researchers because license information, in contrast to patents and most patent applications, is nonpublic. In fact, the information is often considered to be proprietary. Thus, respondents to a licensing survey-even within academic nonprofit settings-must be assured that the financial information that they disclose will remain confidential unless public disclosure is explicitly authorized.
In this article, we describe the academic DNA patent universe and present the results of a federally funded survey of licensing practices at 19 of the 30 US academic institutions that have received the largest number of DNA patents. Our analysis reveals not only that large US research universities are active participants in DNA patenting and licensing, but also that common assumptions about licensing strategies often fail to capture the nuances and complexities of technology transfer in practice.
DNA and intellectual property
We define DNA patents as those patents containing at least one claim that includes a nucleic acid-specific term. Gene patents, a subset of DNA patents that contain proteinencoding nucleic acid sequences, have been of particular interest, as many have proven to be commercially important 1, 2 . In a recent article, Kyle Jensen and Fiona Murray identified 4,270 US patents containing claims on human DNA sequences; sequences from almost 20% of catalogued human genes are found in the claims of US patents (4,382 of 23,688 genes in the National Center for Biotechnology Information RefSeq and Gene databases) 3 .
Diagnostic gene patents have sometimes raised concerns about both cost and access [4] [5] [6] . Several reports from national and international bodies note that genetic testing applications require far less investment after initial gene discovery than development of therapeutic proteins, and so the rationale for exclusive intellectual property rights may be less compelling [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] .
DNA patents have generated other concerns, as well. In 1998, Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg from the University of Michigan, posited that a profusion of patents upstream from final products can create an 'anticommons' effect-creating a thicket of patents that encumber research progress and access to resources thus making it difficult to aggregate sufficient intellectual property (IP) and stifling innovation 12 . In this context, however, a recent survey of biomedical scientists by John Walsh, Charlene Cho and Wesley Cohen found minimal research-blocking effects from patents, but somewhat more 'friction' caused by material transfer agreements 13 (contracts between institutions governing the transfer of research material). Transfers from industry to academe were more likely to come with conditions on publication, rights to improvements, or royalties, and took longer on average to complete than transfers among academic institutions 13 . The same survey found that few academic scientists check for patents related to their research 13, 14 .
Another aspect of the debate about whether intellectual property fosters or hinders biomedical research relates to 'research tools,' such as the ideas, data, materials or methods used to conduct research. Many such materials and methods are disclosed or claimed in DNA patents. The gene patent subset of DNA patents has also been drawn into the research tools debate because genes are not only inputs to developing genetic tests and therapeutic proteins, and thus directly relevant to medically important products and services, but are also crucially important tools for ongoing research. Patent claims based on DNA sequences can be infringed by research activities that entail making or using the claimed sequence, not just by selling products or services.
The role of the National Institutes of Health
As the primary source of biomedical research funding in the United States, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) has been concerned that patenting and licensing practices not impede advances in biomedical research, particularly for inventions arising from NIH funding. To promote broad access, NIH developed guidelines for grantee institutions about how to license biomedical research resources arising from federally funded research. In February 1996, the US National Research Council (NRC) convened a workshop on the patenting and licensing of such resources, or research tools, in molecular biology 15 . Even as the report from that workshop was being prepared, then-NIH director Harold Varmus invited Rebecca Eisenberg to chair a working group to recommend policies NIH might pursue to ensure maximum social benefit from NIH-funded inventions. The working group addressed exchanges of data and research materials, as well as patenting and licensing of research tools in its June 1998 report 16 . In turn, the working group report was one of the sources of input to a December 1999 set of NIH guidelines for the sharing of NIH-funded biomedical research resources 17 . Compliance with those guidelines subsequently became an explicit consideration in the award of NIH grants and contracts. The research tool guidelines are now regarded by at least some technology transfer officers as de facto federal policy. The NIH guidelines urge recipients of NIH grants and contracts to license or otherwise share research tools with all biomedical researchers who request them.
In 2000, the NIH began developing 'Best Practices' guidelines for all genomic inventions. These inventions were broadly construed to include "cDNAs; expressed sequence tags (ESTs); haplotypes; antisense molecules; small interfering RNAs (siRNAs); full-length genes and their expression products; as well as methods and instrumentation for the sequencing of genomes, quantification of nucleic acid molecules, detection of single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), and genetic modifications" 18 . NIH's best practices thus included, but were not restricted to, inventions covered by claims of DNA patents. The guidelines also discussed unpatented methods and materials, which can also be licensed. The best practices guidelines proposed for grantee institutions were based largely on how NIH's own technology transfer office licensed inventions from NIH laboratories. Early drafts of the best practices guidelines were presented to several audiences, including a February 2004 meeting of the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM) [19] [20] [21] .
The revised, final guidelines were published in the Federal Register in April 2005 (ref. 18) . In general, these guidelines recommended that recipients of NIH funding strongly consider broad and nonexclusive licensing of genomic inventions, with allowance for cases when exclusive licensing is needed to induce large investment in post-discovery commercial development.
Survey inception and conception
In late 2002 and early 2003, we designed a survey to address concerns that DNA patents were impeding genomic research, taking into account frequently proposed remedies, including those adopted or floated informally by the NIH before the survey got underway [19] [20] [21] . One of our goals was to determine the degree to which US academic institutions were already practicing or anticipating the NIH technology transfer guidelines.
In 2003, NIH also funded the NRC to study IP in genome and protein research. We presented Our first task was to create a working definition of DNA patents and to collect these patents into a searchable database. For this purpose, we used an algorithm (for details, see Supplementary Methods online) that two of us (R.M.C.-D. and S.J.M.) had refined between 1994 and 2002 from one initially developed by James Martinell at the USPTO to identify all the patents in the Delphion Patent Database (http://www.delphion.com/) whose claims explicitly mention DNA-or RNA-specific terms. Patents identified in this manner were then collated into a publicly accessible database, the DNA Patent Database, which is maintained online and updated weekly (http://dnapatents.georgetown.edu/).
We then searched the DNA patent database for patents assigned to each of the top 100 academic institutions on the National Science Foundation's list of federal R&D funding recipients for FY 2001. The 30 institutions assigned the largest numbers of DNA patents were selected for the survey ( Table 1 ; the survey cutoff was 75 DNA patents). Technology licensing offices at each of these 30 institutions were subsequently invited to participate in a survey covering their patent licensing practices, policies and outcomes.
The survey questions were developed with input from the members of the project's advisory board (for the survey instrument and a list of the Advisory Board, see Supplementary Methods online). Respondents were promised that their licensing information would remain confidential in a secure server. The survey was reviewed and approved in advance by the Georgetown University Social Science Institutional Review Board.
The survey focused on the details of a subset of license agreements containing patents with ages representative of all DNA patents held by the institution, from the oldest to the youngest (see Supplementary Figs. 1 and 2 online) . Detailed license data were obtained for this representative subset of ~500 patents in ~200 license agreements, supplemented by qualitative written responses to open-ended policy questions on the web-based survey, and followed up in semistructured telephone interviews.
The design of the survey (Fig. 1) (Fig. 2) . Our projected total for 2005 (2,954) suggests this decline will continue.
Roughly 78% of US DNA patents are owned by for-profit entities and 22% by nonprofits. Among the top 30 entities holding the largest number of DNA patents in the United States, 16 are for-profit companies, 13 are nonprofit academic institutions and 1 is the US government (mainly but not exclusively from the intramural research program at NIH; see A government interest, indicating that the invention arose in whole or in part from federally funded research, is acknowledged in almost 5,300 (15%) of US DNA patents. Among academic institutions, government interest was acknowledged in approximately half of their DNA patents (see Box 2).
Academic institutions are major players in the patenting and licensing of DNA-based inventions (see Fig. 3 ). The top 30 academic institutions assigned the largest numbers of DNA patents (75 DNA patents or more) are shown in Table 2 . Nineteen of the 30 technology transfer offices that were invited to participate in our survey responded. These 19 offices contributed information to a relational database containing linked records for the ~2,600 DNA patents assigned to, and managed by, those institutions (see Table 2 ).
Patent type and licensing approach
The policy portion of the survey was designed to tease apart respondents' views on useful categories of patents pertinent to licensing policies. These categories, which were not mutually exclusive, covered patents with a range of utilities. One group of questions addressed specifically the subset 'patents on genes, gene fragments and DNA markers.' At one end of the spectrum are patents on fully sequenced human genes encoding therapeutic proteins of known function. At the other end of the spectrum are patents on DNA sequences that are markers for phenotypes. In the middle are patents on genes encoding proteins that are potential drug targets, but that are not themselves therapeutic drugs.
DNA sequences that encode therapeutic proteins. For a fully sequenced gene that encodes a therapeutic protein, the utility and the development risks are both generally acknowledged to be high, and survey respondents largely agreed that they would patent and license such inventions exclusively. For example, Robin Rasor from the University of Michigan's Office of Technology Transfer indicated that the type of license her institution would seek would "probably" be "exclusive." Kathleen Denis at the Rockefeller University Office of Technology Transfer indicated her institution would "patent and license, perhaps exclusively," and Katharine Ku of the Stanford University Office of Technology Licensing responded, "We would be more likely to file a patent application on this and license it exclusively." Richmond Wolf from the Caltech Office of Technology Transfer said: "We would almost certainly file a patent on such a human gene if it had strategic value for us-as well as on the protein and method of its use clinically. Caltech would likely license such a candidate exclusively if that were the best way to transfer the technology and if it were within our policy guidelines." DNA sequences that are markers only. For a partial DNA sequence used only as a phenotypic marker, where the utility is much less The respondent's patent pool, selected by the modified Martinell algorithm on Delphion.
Policy portion: questions on operating practices of responding offices and/or practices and policies of responding institutions. Question on suggested useful categories of such patents from a patent and licensing practice and policy point of view.
Respondents are shown a list of their patents having multiple assignees, as taken from the Delphion assignee field, and asked to indicate which they are not managing.
Respondents are shown a list of their remaining patents and asked to indicate those that were never licensed.
Respondents are shown a list of their remaining patents and asked to identify patents licensed ten or more times.
Respondents bundle their remaining patents into licenses. They create a many-to-many relational database mapping patents to licenses. Source of licensing frequency data Using a drop-down menu, respondents are asked to indicate which institution is managing which patents. (Drop-down menu generated from assignee field in Delphion.)
Three never-licensed but maintained patents are selected by the computer. Respondents are asked to comment on why they paid maintenance fees on these never-licensed patents.
The alternate questionnaire, on groups of ten licenses or more for a single patent set. Source of data in Alternate Questionnaire.
Respondents answer questions on 12 licenses selected by the computer to reflect patents of a range of ages.
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Figure 1
Steps undertaken by survey respondents.
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clear and the development costs and risks are generally modest or low, respondents reported that patenting was less likely, and that if the invention were patented, nonexclusive licensing would be more likely. The survey question did not specify whether the phenotypic markers had clinical utility. Joyce Brinton of the Harvard University Office for Technology and Trademark Licensing wrote, "Where disease-linked mutations that may be useful in clinical diagnostics assays are identified, they sometimes are patented; this decision depends somewhat on the diagnostic kit and service market, which is less robust than the therapeutics market." The importance of market forces in determining licensing strategy was noted by others. For example, Caltech's Wolf responded: "If the phenotype had a significant clinical diagnostic application, we would be likely to patent. Our licensing strategy would depend on market demand." According to Ku, Stanford "would be less likely to file a patent application, unless there seemed to be enough of a market for the marker. Most likely this type of DNA-based invention would be licensed nonexclusively, unless there were a significant investment and justifiable reason for exclusivity."
Rockefeller's Denis, perhaps assuming no diagnostic utility for the marker, wrote that such DNA sequences have been "patented in the past but now [we] resist [the] occasional push to patent-these are not worth the time and the money." DNA sequences comprising genes encoding drug targets. Perhaps because the survey instrument did not specify whether the therapeutic lead against the target had also been discovered, there was the least consensus among the technology transfer offices on how to handle a fully sequenced human gene, where the encoded protein is a target for drug discovery. Jon Soderstrom of the Yale Office of Cooperative Research indicated his university's tech transfer officer "would not file. [ We would] handle the transfer through [a] material transfer agreement." At Stanford, Ku noted, "At the end of the day, we are less likely to file on this than on other biotech inventions." Nevertheless, Stanford might still consider filing for a patent depending on the "commercial interest of the target."
There is also considerable flexibility in the licensing strategies adopted for such patents. At Stanford's tech transfer office, "licensing would depend on what type of company was interested in commercializing the technology-larger companies would probably want to be licensed nonexclusively, small companies may likely need exclusivity to generate investment for working with the target," wrote Ku. Elsewhere, at the Office of Technology Management at the Salk Institute for Biological Studies, Polly Murphy commented that "in the past we would probably have licensed exclusively, but now usually nonexclusively." Caltech's Wolf provided a helpful refinement to the survey question, indicating that his institution's tech transfer personnel "would very likely file such a patent if we could get claims on molecules that bind to the target as a therapeutic application. We would likely license such a patent exclusively if it were the best way to transfer the technology and if it were within our policy guidelines." DNA discoveries or inventions representing research tools. Another group of survey questions addressed 'research tools,' which included, but went well beyond, patents on genes, gene fragments and DNA markers. Respondents were asked how they defined research tools, what their policies and practices regarding the licensing of research tools were and whether these practices would differ if the research tools were patented.
Respondents frequently referred to the NIH guidelines. Some noted the difficulty of defining a research tool, saying that at times tools also required development incentives. For example, Alan Paau from the University of California San Diego (UCSD) commented: "If you know its specific utility, it is not a research tool. If you are using the method to produce a commercial product, then it is not a De facto research exemption, or "rational forbearance" 24 . The assertion of patent rights by for-profit firms against academic research institutions or individual scientists working within their institutions was discussed in three follow-up telephone interviews. Representatives of all three technology transfer offices acknowledged current policies of forbearance on the part of private companies, tempered by awareness that these policies could change. For-profit firms generally do not threaten infringement litigation against academic research institutions (a de facto research exemption), in part because such academic use may improve their invention, and they wish to maintain good will and to ensure access to future academic inventions, and also because the damages are likely to be very small. The question of such complaints about infringement arose in part because of a 2002 Appeals
Court decision that interprets the common law "research exemption" in such a way that it will rarely apply to academic research 25 .
Licensing frequency and exclusivity
The 2,607 patents managed by the 19 responding tech transfer offices were associated with approximately 1,200 license agreements (Fig. 4) . Some patents in the 1-9 group (comprising 1,787 patents) were licensed together with others, whereas some patents were licensed multiple times. Approximately 70% 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 0 1 9 8 9 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 0 1 9 7 9 1 9 7 8 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 2 1 9 Seven hundred seventy-five of the managed patents were never licensed. Approximately 2% of the patents (45) were licensed more than nine times; this patent group includes the more than 400 licenses granted to the Cohen-Boyer trio of patents and the licenses granted to the Axel patents. The correspondence between patents and licenses is clearly not one-to-one; rather it is a many-to-many relationship. For this reason no conclusions can be drawn about the number of distinct inventions that are licensed or commercialized.
Our survey results show that frequency of licensing is an imprecise proxy for license exclusivity, and vice versa (Fig. 4) . Having been licensed once is associated with 'exclusive, all fields of use' licensing only 56% of the time, whereas having been licensed 2-9 times is associated with nonexclusive licensing only 36% of the time (30 patents were selected twice, and one patent was selected three times). Some patents are exclusively licensed many times in different fields of use. Exclusive licenses terminate for a variety of reasons and an invention may be subsequently relicensed. Some licenses are renegotiated and their exclusivity modified from initial licensing, and some 'exclusive' licenses are sublicensed by the licensee.
The term 'exclusive' needs to be used with precision and care. Avoiding exclusivity is often the focus of discussions on how to improve access to biotechnology-related inventions. Exclusivity is, however, a more nuanced property than often supposed. The two categories of exclusivity used in this survey-'exclusive, all fields of use,' 'exclusive, by field of use'-are all lumped together as 'exclusive' in the AUTM survey (an annual survey conducted by academic licensing professionals 26 ). In our view, the absence of important subcategories in the AUTM data can be a source of misinterpretation or confusion. Exclusivity is frequently limited in duration as part of the license itself or by license termination. It can also be limited by geographical area, by field of use, and by the licensor's agreeing to grant only a limited number of additional licenses (co-exclusivity).
The 29 patents licensed more than once, and characterized as having been licensed as 'exclusive, all fields of use' merited further investigation. When we dug deeper, many instances were explained by sequential licensing, where at least one of the licenses was 'exclusive, all fields of use.' In other cases, respondents explained the multiple 'exclusive, all fields of use' licenses by noting that their database tracked sublicenses granted by their 'exclusive, all field of use' licenses, and that they reported the sublicense, and its terms, as a separate license. Not all respondents track such sublicenses, however; this was an area in which the survey instructions were unclear. Thus, the data on sublicenses should be regarded as serendipitous and not systematic. The serendipitous sublicensing data we did garner reinforce the observation that exclusivity alone is not a reliable indicator of availability and utilization.
Broadly licensed patents
Data on the 45 patents licensed ten or more times are rich and interesting, but well beyond the scope of this report. One feature worth noting, however, is that 'diligence clauses,' which contain the contractual requirement that licensees develop the invention or lose rights to it, are generally not regarded as essential in such nonexclusive licenses. That is, the patent holder does not require the multiple licensees to develop the invention further.
Some of these sets of patent licenses generated considerable income, including the wellknown Cohen-Boyer trio of patents [27] [28] [29] , now expired, that were licensed by Stanford and the University of California. As a group, the 45 frequently licensed patents were licensed in 21 separate bundles, containing from one to five patents each. The Cohen-Boyer patent trio, for example, was licensed over 400 times 30 . Most of the 21 bundles were licensed a few dozen times. Columbia University declined to report further on its Axel cotransformation patents [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] beyond noting that they had been licensed ten or more times. A case study in the 2004 book Ivory Tower and Industrial Innovation 36 reports that the Axel patents were licensed to 34 firms and generated over $370 million (1996 dollars) between 1983 and 2000. These broadly licensed patents are thus important both to universities and licensees. However, failure to 'work' the invention is less a concern because licensing is nonexclusive (see Supplementary Tables  1 and 2 online) .
US national policy to enable federal grantees and contractors to patent the results of their work was already emerging when the Bayh-Dole Act passed in 1980. But the Act clarified the rules, made them more uniform among and within funding agencies as well as reinforced the mandate to encourage commercial application of inventions arising from federally funded research 1 . Thus, Bayh-Dole made it easier for commercial firms to license the biotech IP arising from universities and other academic research institutions. On the other hand, it reserved certain rights to the government agency funding research leading to patented invention. Grantees and contractors are obligated by law to report those rights when applying for a patent. Our search algorithm (see Supplementary Methods online) allows us to capture the acknowledgement of a patent's federal funding or government interest by identifying terms common in such acknowledgement.
On the basis of our results, almost 14% of DNA patents report government interest compared with 1.3% of all patents (Table 3) . Of the DNA patents owned by the top 30 academic institutions and the 19 survey respondents, government interest is acknowledged by 50% and 52%, respectively. Studies from the Offices of the Inspector General and the General Accounting Office (OIG) have shown significant underreporting of such 'government interest,' so these numbers may be underestimates of the number of DNA patents linked to federally funded R&D 28, 29 . For example, the Scripps Institute (La Jolla, CA, USA) had reported 54 of 125 patents to NIH as having been developed with its funds; in contrast, the OIG judged that 94 patents had actually involved such funding. (Fig. 5) .
Box 2 Government interest in US DNA patents
Exclusive licensing is consistent with the need to lower the perceived risk of investing in unproven technology to attract private risk capital. Thus, there are trade-offs between optimizing licensing terms solely for startup formation and job creation on the one hand, and making the technology freely available at all times to all potentially interested parties via the intentional avoidance of exclusive or partly exclusive license grants on the other. We also asked whether there were parties with competing interests at the time the license was signed and found that university licensors are responsive to the 'market'-that is, their tendency to grant exclusive licenses is reduced in response to increased outside interest (Fig. 6) . Note that the sensitivity to the market also plays a role in patenting decisions, where respondents cited patent cost and outside market interest as factors in patenting decisions.
License age and termination
Of the 179 licenses for which there is detailed information (these licenses were selected by computer algorithm, so as to contain patents of representative ages in them, as described in the Supplementary Methods online), 50 (28%) were terminated, and in only two cases were such terminations a result of patent expiration. In three cases, the terminated licenses were characterized as "terminated by the institution," and in 35 cases as "terminated by the licensee." Many other interesting examples of termination were given, including "conversion to a nonexclusive" and "by mutual agreement" (see Supplementary Table 2 online) .
There are no obvious patterns in termination by exclusivity: 16 of 65 (26%) of the "exclusive, all field of use" licenses terminated, compared with 16 of 56 (29%) of the "exclusive, by field of use" and 15 of 56 (27%) of the "nonexclusive" licenses. The terminated licenses lasted, on average, fewer years-about 4.5-than the licenses that are still active. Active licenses are, on average, about eight years old, but the age distribution of both terminated and active licenses is very broad.
Diligence milestones
Licenses often have built-in milestones that require the licensee to demonstrate progress toward commercializing the invention and which, if not met, provide the licensor an opportunity to terminate or modify the license; this common strategy allows a university to recapture intellectual property rights. Such 'diligence' (use it or lose it) provisions in the license play an important role in US academic licensing transactions. In this section 'diligence' refers to contractual requirements beyond paying the patent owner a fee, as paying a fee to the licensor is not necessarily correlated with 180 of the patents selected for the main questionnaire (there is duplication, some were selected more than once) are among the 486 patents that were licensed 2-9 times. 7 were in co-exclusive licenses; 29 were in exclusive, all field of use licenses; 98 were in exclusive, by field of use licenses; and 77 were in nonexclusive licenses.
Figure 4
Number of times a DNA patent was licensed.
F E AT U R E making progress toward commercializing an invention. Diligence was measured in the survey by six questions on whether certain kinds of defaults would result in termination or loss of rights. Sample diligence milestones include a requirement that the licensee spend money toward commercializing the invention, or that they submit a potential product for regulatory approval. One or more diligence milestones is included in ~80% of licenses with some degree of exclusivity, but only about 45% of nonexclusive licenses. All respondents use contractual requirements to actively commercialize licensed inventions some of the time. As it was somewhat surprising that diligence milestones were included in only 80% of licenses with a degree of exclusivity, certain institutions were asked to comment on their diligence practices. Two institutions commented that in the past they had negotiated stringent requirements beyond payment of a fee for continuation of a license, but that they had more recently opted for a combination of financial payments and the licensee's desire to maintain a cordial relationship with the licensing institution-a policy that they thought worked better than specific diligence milestones. For patents licensed nonexclusively ten or more times, we found that few diligence clauses were included. During telephone interviews, multiple respondents mentioned mandatory sublicensing as another technique to make technology broadly available. A mandatory sublicense requires the licensee, under certain conditions, to license an invention to a third party if the third party is also qualified and prepared to develop the invention. One phone interviewee referred to "license audits" and "mutual termination" as techniques for taking back rights from current holders and thus renewing broader access to technology not being adequately commercialized.
Conclusions
A central finding of our survey is that simple reports on exclusive and nonexclusive licensing miss important nuances of licensing practice, nuances that are infrequently discussed in the literature on patenting and licensing. An invention licensed just once is not necessarily the object of an exclusive license, and some exclusive licenses are restricted by field of use or in duration or are terminated by one party or the other. Technologies can remain available while exclusively licensed, if the exclusivity is for a particular field of use, or if research or humanitarian-use exemptions have been included in the license. In addition, an exclusive license may, under certain circumstances, be renegotiated to be nonexclusive, or the licensee may sublicense, or conditions for sublicensing may be stipulated in the exclusive license.
Evidence of diligence provisions in license agreements in the quantitative responses was enriched by comments about how different offices monitor and deal with such provisions, such as requirements to raise investment money, to spend money on development, to submit products for US Food and Drug Administration approval and to sell products and services. Mandatory sublicensing is a type of diligence and was described by a few respondents, as were "license audits," "mutual termination" agreements and the mutual desire on the part of both parties to maintain good relations.
Licenses are commonly exclusive in certain fields of use-a type of licensing that is often described with the shorthand phrase 'exclusive by field of use.' Figure 5 illustrates that this exclusive-by-field-of-use licensing is roughly as prevalent, as a whole, across all types of licensees, as exclusive licenses in all fields of use, or nonexclusive licenses. Thus, the quantitative portion of the survey corroborates the qualitative portion, where respondents report using such field-of-use licensing in their contracts. Our findings suggest that licensing practices at the large and experienced academic institutions studied in this survey are largely in agreement with the NIH guidelines for research tools and genomic inventions 17, 18 . A third important survey finding is the market sensitivity observed in both patenting and licensing behavior. The number of DNA patents has declined each year since 2001 (ref. 23) (Fig. 2) . In the qualitative portion of the questionnaire, respondents noted patent costs as a factor. Patent prosecution, maintenance and management costs-estimated by respondents at between $20,000 and $30,000 per patent-militate against patenting inventions that are unlikely to recover those costs, and encourage greater selectivity in what gets patented. Figure 6 illustrates how exclusivity in licenses is reduced in response to increased outside interest, and suggests a fruitful area for future work, that is, understanding the timing of licenses relative to publication of the inventions.
The quantitative data and qualitative written and oral responses paint a picture of practices evolving in light of experience. These practices appear to be designed pragmatically to accommodate both economic goals, such as revenue generation and new company formation, and social goals, such as ensuring utilization and availability of federally funded inventions.
Note: Supplementary information is available on the Nature Biotechnology website.
